PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE APPLICATION OF PLEA BARGAINING IN NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A CORRELATIVE ANALYSIS

Abstract

Prosecutors confront a broad spectrum of circumstances in the administration of criminal justice and are vested with substantial discretion in determining the appropriate course of action in each case. Though this autonomy has historically been a defining attribute of the prosecutorial function, it operates within the confines of legal provisions and policy directives intended to guide and structure decision-making. Despite these frameworks, ongoing concerns highlight the need to balance prosecutorial independence with the imperatives of fairness, transparency, and accountability. This tension is most pronounced in the context of plea bargaining, where prosecutors may offer reduced charges or recommend mitigated sentences in exchange for a guilty plea. The scope and application of this discretion differ significantly across jurisdictions. Adopting a doctrinal method of research, this article critically examines the relationship between prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, focusing on Nigeria and the United States. The discussion in the paper principally evaluates the breadth of prosecutorial discretion and its impact on negotiated pleas, identifying issues relating to potential overreach, unequal bargaining positions, and procedural safeguards. The article further considers statutory and institutional limitations, alongside judicial attitudes toward prosecutorial choices. It concludes by proposing reforms aimed at promoting accountability, enhancing consistency, and strengthening public trust in Nigeria’s criminal justice process.